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1 Revisionism About Qualia
Eliminativists about qualia (e.g. Dennett; Frankish, forthcoming) make this claim:
NE: Qualia do not exist.
(For those that consider that wording paradoxical, NE can be glossed as “The term 
‘qualia’ does not refer to anything”.)
Some eliminativist arguments for NE proceed by first arguing for NP:
NP: There is nothing that has (or: Nothing could have) all the properties that 
qualia realists take to be essential to qualia.
NE is then thought to follow from NP so obviously that the step is rarely, if ever, 
explicitly mentioned or justified.  Some of Daniel Dennett’s arguments against the 
reality of qualia can be seen as taking this form.  (Dennett 1988) for example, 
employs such a strategy, the properties operative in the NP step being intrinsicness, 
ineffability, privacy and immediacy. (In what follows, we will be assuming that these 
properties, as elucidated by Dennett, are indeed what qualia realists take to be 
constitutive of qualia.  Much of what we have to say does not depend on this 
assumption.)
1  Although the second author played a leading role in developing the original virtual machine 
functionalism account of qualia, in (Sloman and Chrisley 2003), the current paper is mainly the work 
of the first author.  An unpublished document developing some of these ideas and comparing them 
with closely related work by Maley and Piccinini[2013] is
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/vm-functionalism.html
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Revisionists, on the other hand, accept many or all of the arguments against there 
being features of conscious experience that are intrinsic, ineffable, private and 
immediate, but depart from the eliminativists by not denying that qualia exist —  
with the proviso that qualia may not be what many people, (other) qualia realists 
and eliminativists alike, think they are.  That is, revisionists hold NP but deny (or at 
least remain agnostic about) NE. (For ease of exposition, we will initially assume 
revisionists are qualia realists, but will return to the agnostic option in section 
2.3.3.) In particular, revisionists deny that the NE follows from the NP.  (How can that
be so? We say more about that in section 2.1.)
Another way of expressing the difference between qualia revisionism and qualia 
eliminativism is in terms of the distinction between illusion and hallucination.
Standardly, illusion is “any perceptual situation in which a physical object is actually 
perceived, but in which that object perceptually appears other than it really is” 
(Smith 2002, emphasis added), while the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
defines a hallucination to “an experience which seems exactly like a veridical 
perception of an ordinary object but where there is no such object there to be 
perceived.” (Crane & French, emphasis added).2  Thus, Blackmore:  “To say that 
consciousness is an illusion is not to say that it doesn’t exist, but that it is not what it 
seems to be―more like a mirage or a visual illusion.”  So a reasonable alternative 
name for revisionism would be “illusionism”.  However, despite this widely accepted 
distinction between illusion and hallucination, some use the term “illusion” to 
include cases where, they claim, there is no object being perceived.  For example, 
(Frankish forthcoming) proposes “illusionism” as a name for the position “which 
holds that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion and aims to explain why it seems 
2 On the other hand, we ourselves can only accept these definitions as they stand if virtual machine 
states are counted as “physical” and “ordinary” objects, a contentious view that we do not wish to 
defend here.  A better move for our purposes would be to generalize the definitions: Illusion is any 
(including interoceptive) perceptual situation in which an object is actually perceived, but in which 
that object perceptually appears other than it really is; hallucination is an experience which seems 
exactly like a veridical (possibly interoceptive) perception of an object but where there is no such 
object there to be perceived.”
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to exist” (p 1, emphasis in the original).  According to the standard distinction, 
“hallucinationism” might be a more accurate (although perhaps less catchy) name 
for the position Frankish is advocating.
Some more examples of qualia revisionists may be helpful.  Many (but not all) of 
those who embrace the “Grand Illusion” view of consciousness (Noë 2002) are 
revisionists about consciousness in general, and some may be revisionists about 
qualia in particular.  A particularly clear-cut case of a revisionist about qualia is Derk
Pereboom; cf. his “qualitative inaccuracy hypothesis”:  “[I]ntrospection represents 
phenomenal properties as having certain characteristic qualitative natures, and it 
may be that these properties actually lack such features." (Pereboom 2011, p 3).3  
Another clear qualia revisionist is Drew McDermott, who has explicitly embraced 
(McDermott 2007, section 3.4) the revisionist account of qualia put forward in 
(Sloman and Chrisley 2003), and which is restated here in sections 2.1 and 2.2.2.  On
the other hand, Michael Graziano’s attention schema theory (Graziano 2013) is hard 
to categorize as revisionist or eliminativist.  Although in describing his theory he 
says things such as “awareness exists only as a simulation”, which would put him in 
the eliminativist/hallucinationist camp, he also distances himself from such a simple
metaphysical position:
“The attention schema theory could be said to lie half-way between two common
views. In his groundbreaking book in 1991, Dennett explored a cognitive 
approach to consciousness, suggesting that the concept of qualia, of the inner, 
private experiences, is incoherent and thus we cannot truly have them. Others, 
such as Searle, suggested that the inner, subjective state exists by definition and 
is immune to attempts to explain it away. The present view lies somewhere in
between; or perhaps, in the present view, the distinction between Dennett and 
Searle becomes moot. In the attention schema theory, the brain contains a 
representation, a rich informational description. The thing depicted in such 
3 As Pereboom’s position has only recently come to our attention, we have not yet had a chance to 
analyze his insights in this area; we hope to do so on a future occasion.
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nuance is experienceness. Is it real? Is it not? Does it matter? If it is depicted then 
doesn’t it have a type of simulated reality?” (p. 56, emphasis added).
One last terminological twist is that Frankish uses the term “weak illusionism” to 
refer to revisionism as defined above:
“[Illusionism] should be distinguished from a weaker view according to which 
some of the supposed features of phenomenal consciousness are illusory. Many 
conservative realists argue that phenomenal properties, though real, do not 
possess the problematic features sometimes ascribed to them, such as being 
ineffable, intrinsic, private, and infallibly known. Phenomenal feels, they argue, 
are physical properties which introspection misrepresents as ineffable, intrinsic, 
and so on. We might call this weak illusionism, in contrast to the strong form 
advocated here.” (p 3)
Frankish’s definition of illusionism is helpful in highlighting a responsibility that 
both revisionist and eliminativist (illusionist and hallucinationist) accounts of qualia
incur:  the duty of explaining why things seem other than they are.  For revisionists, 
however, this responsibility takes a form different from the eliminativist duty 
Frankish mentions.  Even if technically correct, it would be misleading to describe 
the responsibility for the revisionist as that of “explaining why qualia seem to exist”, 
since the standard reading of that phrase presupposes, unlike the revisionist, that 
qualia don’t exist.  Given that we are initially assuming that revisionists are realist 
about qualia, it would be more usual to describe their corresponding responsibility 
as that of explaining how we have knowledge of the existence of qualia.  Beyond this,
however, the revisionist needs to explain why qualia seem to have the properties 
that they seem to have, despite not having them.  Carruthers, another revisionist, is 
very clear on this point:
“[A] successful explanation of phenomenal consciousness… should
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1. explain how phenomenally conscious states have a subjective 
dimension; how they have feel; why there is something which it is like to 
undergo them;
2. why the properties involved in phenomenal consciousness should seem 
to their subjects to be intrinsic and non-relationally individuated;
3. why the properties distinctive of phenomenal consciousness can seem to 
their subjects to be ineffable or indescribable;
4. why those properties can seem in some way private to their possessors; 
and
5. how it can seem to subjects that we have infallible (as opposed to merely
privileged) knowledge of phenomenally conscious properties.’’
Note that the first constraint does not have the “explain why it seems that” form the 
others do.  This is important, as it highlights a possible explanatory advantage of the 
revisionist strategy as compared to the eliminativist one.  The advantage concerns 
dealing with the worry:  “How can consciousness be a hallucination, since only a 
conscious subject can suffer from a hallucination?”.  This is not the place to give a full
assessment of this worry and responses to it, but the basic point we wish to 
highlight here is that in some situations, the revisionist view has more room for 
manoeuvre in replying to objections than does the eliminativist view.  For example, 
consider L:
L:  A subject has qualia iff there is something it is like to be that subject.
Perhaps some qualia eliminativists would reject L.  (For example, it might be that the
only sense they can attach to "there is something it is like to be X" is no different 
from the sense of "X is conscious", though more obscurely expressed, and yet they 
are not eliminativists about consciousness.) But suppose for the sake of  argument 
that both a qualia revisionist and a qualia eliminativist agreed on L.  Then it follows 
that the qualia eliminativist must deny that there is something it is like to be a 
subject.  And this can indeed be hard to square with also believing that 
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consciousness is a hallucination, since it seems that only someone for whom it is like
something to be them can suffer from a hallucination.  But for revisionists, things are
not so problematic.  Yes, only someone for whom it is like something to be them can 
suffer from an illusion. But since revisionists do not deny that there are qualia, they 
can accept L and still hold that it is like something to be a subject, and thus that 
subjects can be victims of illusions (and hallucinations), including the illusions that 
qualia are intrinsic, immediate, ineffable and private.  So, at least in some cases, the 
revisionist (illusionist) does not run into self-defeating trouble with the claim that 
consciousness is an illusion in the way the eliminativist (hallucinationist) runs into 
self-defeating trouble with the claim that consciousness is a hallucination.
Returning to Carruthers’ explanatory desiderata:  Eliminativists (hallucinationists) 
will have similar explanatory obligations, but given the existentially negative nature 
of their position, two changes would have to be made to Carruthers’ criteria:
1. Constraint 1 would likely need to be converted into the same “explain why it 
seems that” format as constraints 2-5.
2. Eliminativist obligations are not well expressed in language that presupposes
the existence of qualia and the properties of qualia.  Instead, they are more 
easily stated in terms of explaining the subject’s linguistic behaviour.
Thus we would have as desiderata the requirements to explain why people say such 
things as:
1.  “Phenomenally conscious states have a subjective dimension” “Phenomenally 
conscious states have feel” and “There is something which it is like to undergo 
phenomenally conscious states”
2. “Phenomenal consciousness is intrinsic and non-relationally individuated”
3. “The properties distinctive of phenomenal consciousness are ineffable or 
indescribable”
4. “The properties distinctive of phenomenal consciousness are private to their 
possessors”
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5. “We have infallible (as opposed to merely privileged) knowledge of 
phenomenally conscious properties”.
Which is, in essence, the heterophenomenological approach (Dennett).  Revisionism 
can therefore be viewed as a kind of ontologically conservative 
heterophenomenology (Chrisley 2008): in explaining people’s (especially 
philosophers’) qualia talk, do not assume that qualia have the properties that people
attribute to qualia in such talk (that’s the heterophenomenological part), but do 
assume (or at least leave open the possibility; see section 2.3.3) that the features of 
experience that people (incorrectly) attribute those properties to, namely qualia, do 
exist (that’s the ontologically conservative part).
By highlighting Carruthers’ desiderata, we do not mean to suggest that they are the 
only constraints on a satisfactory theory of qualia.  A naturalistic theory of qualia of 
the sort we aspire to should not merely attempt to specify what qualia are and why 
they seem to be the way they seem, but should also explain how instances could 
have been brought into existence by natural processes occurring on an initially 
lifeless planet and how many intermediate forms of consciousness (and qualia), and 
supporting mechanisms (physical and virtual machinery) were required both in the 
evolutionary history of current highly conscious and intelligent organisms, and in 
the individual developments between a newly fertilized egg and the adult crow, 
monkey, squirrel, elephant or philosopher.
Although these “extra” constraints will not play a central role in this paper, we 
should clarify one thing before moving on.  In taking on board these biological 
constraints, we do not thereby commit ourselves to the view that only biological 
organisms can be conscious, have qualia, etc.  On the contray, we believe that ideally, 
a theory of consciousness should explain how, in principle, artificial intelligence 
products, such as future household robots, could also have various forms of 
consciousness, possibly including visual and tactile qualia for example, and whether 
this could be implemented in current digital technology or whether some other sort 
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of implementation would be needed (e.g. based partly on chemical computation, 
which (Turing 1950) suggested was true of brains).  
Finally, any revisionist account of anything, qualia included, has to deal with charges 
of changing the subject.  In the case of qualia, opponents of revision (eliminativists 
and realists alike) might insist that “qualities of experience that are ineffable, 
immediate, intrinsic and private” is just what we mean by “qualia”.  So whatever a 
qualia revisionist is talking about (defending, explaining, etc.) they are not talking 
about qualia. We will discuss how two different revisionist accounts of qualia 
attempt to repel these charges in 2.1 and 2.2.1.  It is to these accounts that we now 
turn.
2. Functionalism And Revisionism
With the revisionist strategy in view, in what follows we would like to clarify it 
further by comparing two functionalist revisionist accounts of qualia:  our own 
proposal, which can be called “Virtual Machine Functionalism” (or VMF; Sloman and 
Chrisley 2003), and Gilbert Harman’s account as expounded in (Harman 1990; 
Harman 2007).
2.1 The Virtual Machine Functionalism Account of Qualia 
Technically, the VMF proposal isn’t revisionist in the sense expounded in section 1 
(the reasons why not will be made clear in section 2.2.3).  But the VMF account does 
embrace the key (ontologically conservative) revisionist belief that NE does not 
follow from NP.
The VMF approach assumes that there are various working designs for information-
processing architectures for more or less intelligent (or at least competent) systems 
(i.e., organisms, or, possibly, artificial systems), some of which allow the system to 
attend to and acquire information about some of the intermediate data-structures 
involved in processing sensory information, and to discover differences between 
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changes that are produced by changes in the physical environment and changes that 
result from changes in the perceiver — e.g. alterations of viewpoint, looking through
distorting lenses, screwing up eyes, tapping lower eyelid, or developing new 
introspective capabilities, e.g. as a result of attending art school, or engaging in 
systematic self observation.
Not all such discoveries are available for all systems or for all intermediate 
information structures. Some sensory details may be constantly overwritten, and in 
some cases, although they are used for online control in sensory-motor control 
loops, it may be that no records of the intermediate states are made available for 
'higher level' cognitive processing, or preserved for later inspection.  For example, 
some of the internal states and processes of feature-detectors used for high-speed 
control of actions may be inaccessible to scrutiny.  This would imply that changes in 
such states cannot be detected. The same goes for many information processes 
involved in metabolic functions (in normal circumstances, though some of them 
change during infections and the changed states become detectable, e.g. during an 
attack of flu).
Moreover, the VMF approach allows that there may be several intermediate levels of 
abstraction in sensory/perceptual or motor processing, some but not necessarily all 
of which may be accessible to internal self-monitoring. This is obvious in language 
understanding and production (e.g. acoustic, phonological, phonemic, morphemic, 
lexical, and various syntactic, semantic and pragmatic levels of processing). Only 
expert linguists are (or can easily become) aware of all of them, though all normal 
language users use them all. It may be possible for some individuals to develop 
various new sub-skills if they have extendable/trainable portions of their 
information processing architectures.  However, these abilities are not all there from 
birth, and how the required mechanisms (architectural layers) develop is mostly 
unknown.
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The heart, then, of the VMF account of qualia is the proposal that qualia are 
properties of the virtual machine states or components of those states that give rise 
to qualia talk (or qualia thoughts).  It may seem, to the subject whose currently 
running virtual machinery includes such states or sub-processes, or data-structures, 
that these properties are immediate, intrinsic, ineffable and private, but (the VMF 
account proposes) that such a subject is incorrect, and the fact that these properties 
seem that way to the subject in which they are manifested can be explained in terms 
of their informational properties (for details see 2.2.1 and 2.2.2).  This is the sense in
which the VMF account of qualia is a revisionist one.
A further attraction of the VMF account, which we can do no more than note here, is 
its potential to integrate its constitutive and revisionistic explanations of qualia with 
explanations of their phylogenetic and ontogenetic origins and dynamics, which we 
proposed as being further constraints on a naturalistic account of consciousness in 
section 1.
As also pointed out in section 1, any revisionist account of anything, qualia included, 
has to deal with charges of changing the subject.  The proponent of the VMF account 
is free to reply that to make that charge against them would be to confuse meaning 
and reference.  Obviously, one can use different concepts (meanings) to talk about 
(refer to) the same thing.  The revisionist is proposing we use different concepts to 
talk about a previously talked about subject, and is changing the subject only if those
concepts do not preserve reference.  The VMF account can ensure sameness of 
reference by relying on a causal theory of reference: it is hypothesized that the word 
“qualia” refers to whatever virtual machine states, substates, and processes,  cause 
and regulate our use of that word.  Those virtual machine components can also be 
referred to by using the terms and concepts of a sufficiently accurate and detailed 
architectural account of the subject in question (these are referred to as 
“architecture-based” concepts in (Sloman and Chrisley 2003)).  In such a case, co-
reference is preserved, and so revision without changing the subject is 
accomplished.
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It should be stressed that this model of scientific progress (a causal theory 
grounding sameness of reference to a subject matter in the face of a shift from a less 
correct to a more correct conceptualisation or theory of that subject matter) is 
hardly new (Kripke 1980).  It is a standard way to make sense of the notion that the 
ancients had an incorrect account of the same stuff that our account of gold is of, 
rather than having a correct account of something else (since they had different 
concepts than we have now).  What is more likely to strike some as novel is the 
application of this idea to the case of qualia talk instead of, e.g., gold talk.
2.2 Harman’s Account of Qualia and Comparison with VFM
We turn now to a comparative discussion of Harman’s account of qualia.  There are 
some broad points of agreement between his account and the VMF account:  both 
are functionalist, and accept that qualia as standardly construed are problematic, 
either in themselves, or in their recalcitrance with respect to functionalist modes of 
explanation.  And both accounts this it is the standard understanding of qualia which
has to be given up, not functionalism or qualia themselves.  That is, both accounts 
are revisionist in spirit.  But there are some notable differences between them, some
of which are revealed in their answers to three questions: “Are we aware of qualia?”, 
“Are inverted qualia possible?”, and even “Do qualia exist?”.  We now discuss the two 
accounts’ answers to these questions, in turn.
2.2.1 Are we aware of qualia? 
A key part of Harman’s account is brought to the fore in his response to a standard, 
qualia-based objection to functionalist accounts of consciousness: 
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"When you attend to a pain in your leg or to your experience of the redness of an 
apple, you are aware of an intrinsic quality of your experience, where an intrinsic
quality is a quality something has in itself, apart from its relations to other 
things. This quality of experience cannot be captured in a functional definition, 
since such a definition is concerned entirely with relations, relations between 
mental states and perceptual input, relations among mental states, and relations
between mental states and behavioral output.” (Harman 1990, p 41) 
Harman’s response centres on making a distinction between two kinds of features in
play in experience: 
 Features by virtue of which an experience has the content it has (call them C-
features)
 Features that one is made aware of by virtue of having an experience (call 
them A-features)
Harman argues that these are typically conflated, but are in fact disjoint.  An 
experience presents something (call it the object of the experience) as being some 
way, as having some feature, character or quality.  It is the object of experience and 
the features that experience represents that object as having that a subject is made 
aware of by virtue of having that experience.  The experience does not, Harman 
argues, have that feature itself.  Nor does it present itself as having that feature.  So, 
one is not, by virtue of having an experience, made aware of the features of that 
experience, or at least not the intrinsic features of that experience by virtue of which
it has the content it has.
Harman then deems these C-features to be the intrinsic features or intrinsic 
character of experience, allowing him to conclude that we are not aware of the 
intrinsic character of our experiences.  The reply to the qualia-based objection to 
functionalism then comes swiftly:  “[S]ince you are not aware of the intrinsic 
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character of your experience, the fact that functionalism abstracts from the intrinsic 
character of experience does not show it leaves out anything you are aware of.” 
However, the objection which Harman posed against himself did not invoke the 
experience of pain in one's leg or experiencing a red apple, but the more 
introspective cases of attending to those experiences.  So while one may concede 
that Harman is right that in normal experience the intrinsic qualities of those 
experiences may be inaccessible, one might yet suspect that this is not true for the 
introspective case at hand.  Nonetheless, Harman insists the introspective case is the
same as the non-introspective case (a similar position is put forward in (Dretske 
1995) and (Tye 1995)).  Thinking that they aren’t, that introspection can somehow 
reveal the intrinsic features of experience, in a manner similar to how one can 
inspect the features of a painting by virtue of which it has its content, is, he claims, to
make a false analogy between experiences and paintings: 
"Things are different with paintings. In the case of a painting Eloise can be 
aware of those features of the painting that are responsible for its being a 
painting of a unicorn. That is, she can turn her attention to the pattern of the 
paint on the canvas by virtue of which the painting represents a unicorn. But in 
the case of her visual experience of a tree, I want to say that she is not aware of, 
as it were, the mental paint by virtue of which her experience is an experience of 
seeing a tree. She is aware only of the intentional or relational features of her 
experience, not of its intrinsic nonintentional features.  Some sense datum 
theorists will object that Eloise is indeed aware of the relevant mental paint 
when she is aware of an arrangement of color, because these sense datum 
theorists assert that the color she is aware of is inner and mental and not a 
property of external objects. But, this sense datum claim is counter to ordinary 
visual experience. When Eloise sees a tree before her, the colors she experiences 
are all experienced as features of the tree and its surroundings. None of them are 
experienced as intrinsic features of her experience. Nor does she experience any 
features of anything as intrinsic features of her experience." 
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Harman concludes by underlining the generality of Eloise’s case in a way that is 
meant to hit home: 
"And that is true of you too. There is nothing special about Eloise's visual 
experience. When you see a tree, you do not experience any features as intrinsic 
features of your experience. Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to 
intrinsic features of your visual experience. I predict you will find that the only 
features there to turn your attention to will be features of the presented tree, 
including relational features of the tree "from here.”" 
We can now ask:  in what sense, if any, is Harman’s account revisionist?  One 
indication that it is revisionist is that the account is susceptible to a particular 
criticism, a susceptibility that is characteristic of revisionist accounts.  The criticism, 
first mentioned in section 1, is that it changes the subject.  Naïve (that is, non-
revisionist) qualia realists could object that, in the sense of “intrinsic character” they
use to characterize qualia, it is impossible that one not be aware of the intrinsic 
character of one's experience - “intrinsic character” is precisely meant to pick out 
the A-features of experience.  So even if Harman is right in claiming that the C-
features and A-features can come apart, “intrinsic character”, they might argue, 
should track the latter, not the former.  For these naïve qualia realists, qualia may 
indeed be what give experiences the content they have.  But it is more central to the 
notion of qualia that they are qualities of which the subject of an experience is 
aware.  Harman is in effect claiming that naïve qualia realists are wrong that there is 
anything “mental” one becomes aware of when one introspects (NP), but denying 
that this means there are no qualia, since qualia are the (non-introspectable) 
intrinsic properties of experience.
Although a full discussion of this “transparent” view of qualia is not possible here, 
we can say that crucial phenomenological argument on which Harman relies 
(involving Eloise, above) is not persuasive, at least not to us.  When we turn our 
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attention to the intrinsic features of our visual experience, our attention is drawn, at 
least some times, to what we referred to in (Sloman and Chrisley 2003) as “features 
of the mode of perception”.  For example, it is a feature of my mode of perception of 
the monitor in front of me now that there is more legible detail near my current 
point of fixation, and that this increased level of detail moves as my point of fixation 
changes.  These are not features of the monitor, nor are they experienced as such, at 
least not when I turn my attention to my experience.  More importantly, they are not 
experienced as features of the monitor itself, nor are they experienced at all in the 
absence of introspection.  Another example is one’s awareness of motion when one 
gently wiggles one’s lower eyelid with a finger, while looking at the tree.  Our 
sensorimotor systems are good at determining whether changes to the 
sensorimotor manifold are due to changes in what is being perceived, or something 
to do with the changes in the perceptual apparatus/perceiver.4 Is it so improbable 
that this distinction might make itself apparent in phenomenal consciousness?
This phenomenological counter-argument and alternative model of introspection is 
not meant to be a decisive refutation of Harman’s view.  Our phenomenological clash
here is merely touching on a well-established debate between two views of 
introspection, the traditional “inner target” view, which can be traced back via 
Armstrong to Locke, and “transparency” views like Shoemaker’s (and Harman’s) 
that replace the idea that introspection is a kind of inner sense with the claim that it 
is rather a way of attending to the qualities of the perceived object (even if that 
object has to be an intentional object in the case of non-veridical, perception-like 
experiences).  We do not presume to resolve this dispute here; rather, we wish to 
highlight this disagreement as a key difference between our functionalist account of 
qualia and Harman’s.  For those functionalists who do not wish to embrace the view 
that we are not aware of the intrinsic qualities of our experiences, there is an 
alternative. 
4 A notable model of how this is done, and how it can go wrong (for example, in schizophrenia) is the
comparator model of control; see, e.g., (Frith, et al 2000).
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Although functionalism and the “inner target” view of introspection are both well-
known, traditional views in the philosophy of mind, they come together in the VMF 
account of qualia in a novel way.  On the VMF account, when one introspects, one is 
having an experience5 (N) the object of which is that (or another) experience (E), 
such that N represents E as having particular features, character, or qualities f.
 Further, it might be claimed, it is these features f of E that give E the content it has 
(i.e., that make it the case that E has an apple as its object and that E is presenting 
that object as being red).  Harman may be right that a subject is not made aware of f 
by virtue of having E (which instead makes available an apple and redness).  But, 
plausibly, one is made aware of f by virtue of having experience N, the introspection 
of E.
On the VMF account it is also the case that along with any experience E and features 
f of E that you are aware of by virtue of having introspective experience N, there will 
be many aspects of the information processing episode that you are (merely) 
potentially aware of (e.g. that you would become aware of if you reflected on other 
cases, or if something happened to draw your attention to differences between two 
experiences that involve changing relationships). For example, if you dimly 
experience a familiar face reflected in a window you may fail to notice that part of 
the experience concerns the distance of the face. But you might come to notice that if
the reflected face moved closer. For the VMF theorist, this merely points to the fact 
that the content of a vast amount of processing does not receive attention, but is 
capable of doing so, as distinct from other processing where the information used is 
beyond the reach of (normal) consicousness, e.g. low level acoustic processing of 
speech sounds or visual processing of colours (which appears to be non-relational 
but is highly 'relational' as shown by various illusions).
5 Note that for argument’s sake we are focussing here on instances of introspection that are 
themselves experiences, since those are the ones that generate this particular difficulty for the kind of
“inner target” notion of introspection that the VMF account assumes.  But this does not rule out the 
possibility of non-experiential introspection; that both kinds of introspection might be 
understandable in similar terms would be, to our minds, another advantage of the VMF account.
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One might wonder how N could have E as its object.  Given that N and E are distinct 
experiences, if a subject is having experience I then she is ipso facto not having 
experience E, and thus while the subject is having N there is no experience E to serve
as the object of N.  At best, N can have as its object a memory or other representation
of E that exists at the same time as N.
There is more than one way to respond to this worry.  One response notes that the 
worry relies on the following assumption concerning the temporal relation between 
perception and the objects of perception (exteroception and interoception alike):
T: For x to be the object of a perception at time t, x must exist at time t.
This assumption can be questioned.  Of course non-existent objects cannot enter 
into relations, but that is not required here. All that is required is that a relation can 
hold at time t between an object that exists at time t and another object that exists at
a time earlier than t.  In fact, we find it natural to say that a subject is seeing a distant
star (and not seeing a representation or memory of that star), even in the case 
where the star in question ceased to exist millions of years before the subject’s birth.
Another line of response is to maintain that N and E can exist at the same time.  For 
example, it might be that a subject can have more than one distinct experience 
simultaneously, or that experiences can have other experiences as proper parts. VMF
is well poised to make sense of these proposals by way of identifying6 experiences 
with components of virtual machine states and processes, given that it explicitly 
differs from standard functionalism in allowing for functional sub-states that can be 
tokened simultaneously, or nested.
6 "Identifying" may be too strong. There are relationships of implementation or realisation
that are not cases of identity per se that might more accurately characterize the relationship between 
experiences and virtual machine states.  But further consideration of these metaphysical details will 
have to be left to another occasion.
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However, if one still had doubts about these mereological possibilities for 
experiences, there is a third line of response that explicitly draws on features of the 
VMF version of revisionist functionalism in a different way.  If qualia are identified 
with (or implemented in; see footnote 4) properties of virtual machine states, then it
may very well be that one can only be having an experience with a given quale if one 
is in the corresponding VMF state.  But it is possible to get information about, or 
“inspect” VMF states that are not tokened by inspecting the computational 
structures that are responsible for their deployment and implementation.  So even if 
E must be tokened at t in order to perceive E at t, and even if having an introspective 
experience N precludes being in experiential state E at the same time, one can still 
make room for the “inner target” view of introspection by taking the relation 
between N and E to be intentional, but non-perceptual.  By virtue of being in N one 
can be made aware of the features of E because N is causally related to the 
computational determinants of E.
By the computational determinants of a virtual machine state E we mean the 
currently tokened computational states and properties that, once a triggering 
condition for E’s tokening is met, will jointly determine that it is E that is tokened, as 
opposed to some other virtual machine state E’.  For example, my computer is not 
now running the Firefox application. So the virtual machine state “running Firefox” 
is not now tokened by my computer.  But the computational states and properties 
currently tokened by my computer include the hard disk memory states that store 
the code for Firefox.  And it is these states (among others) that make it the case that, 
when I click on the Firefox icon, my computer enters into the “running Firefox” 
virtual machine state.7
It is worth noting that in general, some states might have some of their properties 
because their determinants (computational or otherwise) have the very same 
7 This illustration employs a familiar computational architecture for expository purposes, but it 
should be stressed that the notion of computational determinants of a non-occurrent virtual machine
state applies much more generally.  Specifically, use of this notion does not restrict us to stored 
program, von Neumann, serial, etc. architectures.
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properties.  Because of the relative abstractness of computational states, this is 
especially likely for virtual machine states and their determinants.  This means that 
the VMF account of qualia can make sense of the introspection N of a not-currently-
tokened experience E, even on a perceptual understanding of introspection.  Even if 
there can be no perception of E itself, there can be perception of the features f of E 
via perception of the same features f of the determinants of E, together with the fact 
that, say, there is a law that ensures that if the determinants of E have f then E will 
have f as well.
One advantage of the “inner target” character of the VMF model of introspection is 
that it does not require, unlike transparency accounts such as Harman’s, an appeal to
intentional objects to serve as the objects of experience, and therefore as the objects 
of introspection, in cases of imagination or hallucination.  Recall that the transparent
account understands introspection as becoming further acquainted with the 
qualities of the object of experience (e.g., a tree).  When, as in imagination or 
hallucination, there is no physical object of experience, Harman’s account requires 
that there be an intentional object of the experience, and it is the features of this 
intentional object, not of any experience, which one is aware of when one 
introspects in such situations.  By contrast, if the VMF account has any explanatory 
connection with intentional objects, it is in the reverse direction; intentional objects 
are not used by the VMF account to explain anything, but rather the VMF account 
can be seen instead as explaining or naturalizing purported relations to such objects 
(or the temptation to speak as such) in terms of as relations to physically-realisable 
objects: virtual machine states.
To recap this section:  Harman’s revisionism is apparent in how he deals with a 
standard objection to functionalist accounts of qualia.  Locating the problem in the 
notion that qualia are both the intrinsic features of experience and the objects of 
introspection, he dissolves the problem by asserting that qualia are the former and 
not the latter, implicitly asking us to revise our concept of qualia accordingly.  He 
also attempts to explain why it seems to some (e.g., naïve qualia realists) that qualia 
19
are both. The VMF account of qualia, while revisionist with respect to other aspects 
of qualia, is neutral on this issue, being consistent with an “inner target” model, in 
which the objects that introspection makes us aware of are indeed the intrinsic 
qualities of experience — properly understood.
2.2.2 Are inverted qualia possible? 
Another well-known objection to functionalist accounts of qualia is based on the 
notion of spectrum inversion.  Harman summarizes the problem:
“[I]t is conceivable that two people should have similarly functioning visual 
systems despite the fact that things that look red to one person look green to the 
other, things that look orange to the first person look blue to the second, and so 
forth (Lycan 1973, Shoemaker 1982). This sort of spectrum inversion in the way 
things look is possible but cannot be given a purely functional description, since 
by hypothesis there are no functional differences between the people in question. 
Since the way things look to a person is an aspect of that person's mental life, this
means that an important aspect of a person's mental life cannot be explicated in 
purely functional terms. (Harman 1990, pp. 33-34).
Harman introduces us to Alice and Fred, an inverted spectrum pair: “Things that 
look red to Alice look green to Fred, things that look blue to Alice look orange to 
Fred” (p 47).  He then gives us a quick theory of perception, in which perceptual 
representations, which have enough causal efficacy to serve as guides, play a central 
role:
“Perceptual processing results in a perceptual representation of that strawberry, 
including a representation of its color. [Alice] uses this representation as her 
guide to the environment, that is, as her belief about the strawberry, in 
particular, her belief about its color.” (p 47). 
Harman then offers a solution which has at its heart this:
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“The hypothesis of the inverted spectrum objection is that the strawberry looks 
different in color to Alice and to Fred. Since everything is supposed to be 
functioning in them in the normal way, it follows that they must have different 
beliefs about the color of the strawberry. If they had the same beliefs while 
having perceptual representations that differed in content, then at least one of 
them would have a perceptual representation that was not functioning as his or 
her belief about the color of the strawberry, which is to say that it would not be 
functioning in what we are assuming is the normal way.” (p 47)
Harman expresses this claim, that a difference of qualia must involve a difference in 
function, in another way:
“[T]here can be nothing one is aware of in having the one experience that one is 
not aware of in having the other, since the intentional content of an experience 
comprises everything one is aware of in having that experience.” (p 49)
The critic of functionalism will no doubt find the forgoing unsatisfying. To assume 
that a difference in qualia amounts to or requires a difference of “perceptual 
representation” or “intentional content” in a sense that has any causal relevance is to
beg the question.  In terms of the first passage just quoted, the critic of functionalism
will insist that Harman needs to address the case in which the beliefs are the same 
and the perceptual representations are (functionally) the same, yet the qualia are 
different.  Harman retorts that it is only someone who assumes that we are 
immediately and directly aware of the intrinsic features of experience who can 
plausibly imagine qualia floating free of perceptual representations and intentional 
content in this way.  And to his lights he has already discredited that assumption 
(see section 2.2.1) – although we tried to sketch an alternative to his view.
The forgoing may or may not be a valid and/or novel criticism of Harman’s position; 
whether it is any of those is subsidiary to the main purpose here, which is to 
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compare and contrast Harman’s account of qualia with the VMF account.  Since we 
sketched a way that one might defend the “inner target” view of introspection, and 
since Harman diagnoses that view as being what enables a view of qualia that 
completely floats free of function, representation and intentional content, is the VMF
account not in trouble?  No – the “inner target” view of introspection might be 
necessary for naïve qualia realism, but it does not imply it, as we hopefully 
demonstrated in 2.2.1.
More important for a comparison of the VMF account and Harman on this issue is 
not the success or failure of his response to the inverted spectrum challenge, but 
that he accepts that it is a valid, well-posed challenge at all.  Such acceptance is in 
stark contrast to the VMF account, which has the implication that, at least in the case
of some qualia, it is incoherent to wonder if a quale in one individual may or may not
be the very same quale as that in another individual.  To assume at the outset that it 
makes sense, for any given quale, to compare it to a quale in another subject is to 
risk making a category mistake.
This might seem an odd claim to make. The VMF account identifies qualia with 
(properties of) virtual machine states, which are themselves public, objectively 
observable phenomena, so why can’t their properties be compared or identified?  
Can’t we ask (and answer) the question of whether two computers (say) are in the 
same virtual machine state?  Things get notoriously problematic when comparing 
the functional states of non-functionally identical systems, but what about the 
functionally identical case?  Surely when two systems are functionally identical, the 
question of whether or not they are in the same virtual machine state (and therefore
have the same qualia) has a clear, positive answer?
Well, yes and no (a common revisionist response!).  Yes, in that qualia are actually 
properties of objective, publically observable virtual machine states, they are 
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comparable, can be re-instantiated, etc.  They are not private or ineffable.8  But this 
is not engaging with the critics of functionalism on their own terms; saying only this 
is unlikely to persuade a non-revisionist9.  
To translate what the naïve qualia realist is concerned with into the VMF framework,
one needs to consider not (just) architecture-based concepts, such as that of a 
virtual machine state, which assists the theorist in understanding the features of a 
cognitive architecture, including the properties of its experiential states.  One needs 
also to consider what we call architecture-driven concepts, which are concepts the 
architecture makes available to the subject that the architecture is an architecture 
of.10  The architecture-driven concepts with which we are concerned here (the ones 
that will explain why qualia seem to be private and ineffable) are created within an 
architecture as part of the individual history of the architecture or machine. Now 
suppose that agent A with a meta-management system uses a self-organising 
process to develop architecture-driven concepts for categorising (properties of) its 
own internal virtual machine states as sensed by internal monitors.  If such a 
concept C is applied by A to one of its internal states (or one or more of its 
properties), then the only way C can have meaning for A is in relation to the set of 
concepts of which it is a member, which in turn derives only from the history of the 
self-organising process in A. These concepts have what Campbell (1994) refers to as 
‘causal indexicality’.
8 Although they are not in principle private or ineffable, they may, like features of a complex running 
software system lacking sophisticated debugging tools, be inaccessble to the program, the 
programmer, or anyone else, just as many of the intricate neural and electrical operations in brains 
are, in normal circumstances, undetectable by physiologists or physicists. That does not make them 
metaphysically mysterious, or beyond the reach of scientific theory. Most software engineers will 
have had experience of making such normally inaccessible VM states and processes temporarily 
detectable during testing and debugging. The techniques required are very different from those 
required for detecting physical and chemical states and processes. In both cases there is always a 
danger that the observation processes may alter what is observed. (This has nothing to do with 
quantum mechanics.)
9 Especially if they are unfamiliar with the kinds of concepts one typically acquires from first-hand 
experience of developing, testing, and debugging complex running virtual machinery.
10 The rest of this paragraph, and the next two, reproduce page 167-8 of (Sloman and Chrisley 2003)
nearly verbatim.
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The implication of this is that A’s qualia, as experienced/represented by A, are not the 
kind of thing which could be in a system other than A.  If two agents A and B have 
each developed concepts in this way, then if A uses its concept Ca, to think the 
thought ‘I am having experience that is Ca’, and B uses its concept Cb, to think the 
thought ‘I am having experience Cb’ the two thoughts are intrinsically private and 
ineffable, even if A and B actually have exactly the same architecture and have had 
identical histories leading to the formation of structurally identical sets of concepts.  
A can wonder: ‘Does B have an experience described by a concept related to B as my 
concept Ca is related to me?’ But A cannot wonder ‘Does B have experiences of type 
Ca’, for it makes no sense for the concept Ca to be applied outside the context for 
which it was developed, namely one in which A’s internal sensors classify internal 
states. They cannot classify states of B.  This privacy and ineffability of  Ca it will 
likely make it seem to A that its experiences have properties (that is, the qualia 
represented by concept Ca) that are private and ineffable.
To reiterate, when different agents use architecture-driven concepts, that are 
produced by self organising classifiers, to classify internal states of a virtual machine,
and are not even partly explicitly defined in relation to some underlying causes (e.g. 
external objects or a presumed architecture producing the sensed states), then there
is nothing to give those concepts any user-independent content, in the way that our 
colour words have user-independent content because they refer to properties of 
physical objects in a common environment. Thus self-referential architecture- 
driven concepts used by different individuals are strictly non-comparable: not only 
can you not know whether your concepts are the same as mine, the question is 
incoherent. If we use the word ‘qualia’ to refer to the (properties of) virtual machine 
states or entities to which these concepts are applied, then asking whether the 
qualia in two experiencers are the same would then be analogous to asking whether 
two spatial locations in different frames of reference are the same, when the frames 
are moving relative to each other. But it is hard to convince some people that this 
makes no sense, because the question is grammatically well-formed. Sometimes real 
nonsense is not obvious nonsense. 
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So the naïve qualia realists win the battle:  (some) thoughts about qualia are 
intrinsically private and ineffable.  But they lose the war:  qualia themselves are not 
intrinsically private and ineffable, only some ways of thinking of them are – the ways
that are afforded by causally-indexical, architecture-driven concepts of a particular 
sort.
Not everyone will be happy with our position here.  For example, contrast our view 
with what Pete Mandik says in this passage criticizing Lycan’s indexical response 
(Lycan 1996) to Jackson’s Knowledge Argument (Jackson 1982):
“One such problem with the indexical response is that it mistakenly makes 
numerical differences sufficient for subjective differences. To see why this is a bad
thing, consider the following. Suppose that while Mary does not know what it is 
like to see red, Cheri, Mary’s color-sighted colleague, does know what it is like to 
see red. Upon seeing red for the first time, not only does Mary learn what it is like
to see red, she learns what it is like to be Cheri. If Mary and Cheri were physical 
and experiential doppelgangers (though numerically distinct individuals) they 
could each know what it is like to be the other person, regardless of whether 
their numerical non-identity entails divergence of the contents of their indexical 
thoughts.” (Mandik, p 185)
If what we are saying is correct, there is a sense in which Mary does not learn what it
is like to be Cheri.  On our view, even physical doppelgangers do not know, in this 
sense, what it is like to be their fellow doppelganger.  Worse, in this sense, the notion
of “experiential doppelgangers” is incoherent.  Whether this point could be turned 
into a defence of the indexical response to the knowledge argument is a possibility 
we will have to consider on another occasion.
To return to Harman’s account, he considers similar matters in (Harman 2007).  
There he acknowledges an explanatory gap “between some aspect of our conscious 
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mental life and any imaginable objective physical explanation of that aspect” (p 2).  
But he rejects that this explanatory gap implies a metaphysical one, instead locating 
it in the difference between objective and subjective understanding.  A functional 
account of what goes on when someone has an experience is an objective account, 
and, Harman argues, cannot in itself provide understanding of what it is like to have 
that experience, which requires subjective understanding.  In particular, one must be
functionally similar enough to the subject one is trying to understand:
“Suppose we have a completely objective account of translation from the possible
experiences of one creature to those of another, an account in terms of objective 
functional relations, for example. That can be used in order to discover what it is 
like for another creature to have a certain objectively described experience given 
the satisfaction of two analogous requirements. First, one must be able to 
identify one objectively described conceptual system as one’s own. Second, one 
must have in that system something with the same or similar functional 
properties as the given experience. To understand what it is like for the other 
creature to have that experience is to understand which possible experience of 
one’s own is its translation.  If the latter condition is not satisfied, there will be no
way for one to understand what it is like to have the experience in question. 
There will be no way to do it unless one is somehow able to expand one’s own 
conceptual and experiential resources so that one will be able to have something 
corresponding to the other’s experience.” (p 3)
Recall that on the VMF account, there are some ways of thinking of (some) qualia 
that are, because of their history and causal indexicality, inherently private, non-
shareable, and system specific.  The implications of this are problematic for 
Harman’s position as stated above.  Let’s assume that a subject A knows what it is 
like to be A, to have the experience A is now having.  This knowledge, Harman would
agree, consists in having the right conceptual resources to represent that knowledge.
Whether B can know what it is like to experience what A is experiencing depends on 
what is to count as a proper “translation” of the concepts A is using.  One could 
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merely require the concepts to have similar functional profiles, which would yield 
Harman’s position: B can understand subjectively what it is like to be A if B is 
functionally similar enough to A.  But this will not impress the naïve qualia realist, 
who would maintain that sameness of functional role (even of concepts) is not 
enough to capture qualia (because we can imagine them coming apart).  So to 
explain qualia in a sense that is at least continuous with the way the naïve qualia 
realist thinks of them requires a stronger notion of “translation”.  The VMF account 
can agree with naïve qualia realist on this at least:  systems that are exactly 
functionally similar may nevertheless differ in some of their qualia concepts.  Both 
views acknowledge a stronger sense of “translation”, in which one thought is the 
translation of another only if it shares the very same concepts.  In this sense, no one 
can know what it is like to be anyone else; only A can know what it is like to be A.  
The advantage of the VMF account is that it is able to explain this view of qualia with
entirely functionalist, physicalist resources.
2.2.3 Do qualia exist? 
Both the VMF account and Harman’s account of qualia reject naïve qualia realism on 
the one hand, and eliminativism on the other.  That is, both accounts of qualia are 
revisionist, at least in the sense of accepting NP and yet refusing to accept NE (see 
section 1). That is, they do not start by granting that qualia have the properties 
standardly believed to be had by them, and then explaining these properties in 
functionalist terms.
Further, as we have defined the term at the outset, Harman’s account is solidly 
revisionist in asserting that qualia exist.  But as has been hinted a few times above, 
the VMF account is more circumspect.  Given its empirical flavour, it must be.
To understand why, it might be useful to see what goes wrong when one tries to 
derive an a priori commitment to the existence of qualia from the VMF proposal.  
“On the VMF account”, one might think, “the term ‘qualia’ refers to whatever happens
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to cause people to use that term.  So it can’t fail to refer, even if the referent is quite 
other than what people might think it to be.  So qualia must exist.”
Someone could be forgiven for understanding our proposal in this way, since our 
statement of what “qualia” refers to is so quick and simple.  But in fact leaving things 
this way would place the bar too low for referential success. Presumably, on this 
simple view, “phlogiston”, “witches” and “mermaids” also would refer to whatever 
happens to cause people to use those terms, and so phlogiston, witches and 
mermaids exist, albeit in a revisionist sense (compare the criticism in (Churchland 
1981, p. 81) of the functionalist’s attempt to save propositional attitudes).  We do 
not wish to trivialise the revisionist position by adopting this simple view.  Instead, 
we acknowledge that it is a substantive, empirical matter whether out of the 
possible myriad causes of “qualia” talk there is anything sufficiently unified to serve 
as the referent of that term (as there is not for “phlogiston”, “witches” and 
“mermaids”).11  Further, it is not just the causes of qualia talk that play a role here, 
but also qualia thought, at least of the kind where one intends to employ the same 
concept in thought as one expresses with the word “qualia”.  A key claim of the VMF 
approach is that virtual machine states of a certain kind have properties that would 
suffice as the referents of “qualia”. A key hypothesis of the VMF approach is that there
are in fact such states in humans and some animals.  But it is part of the VMF 
approach that we might discover through empirical investigation that that key 
hypothesis is false.  Our physicalist inclinations would then, in the absence of any 
other acceptable account of how “qualia” could refer, push us from illusionism to 
hallucinationism.  But such eliminativism will incur the extra demand of having to 
explain not only why it seemed that there were things that were ineffable, things 
that were intrinsic, things that were private, and things that were immediate, but 
also why all these seemed to be the same thing.
Compare Kevin O’Regan, who writes the following in a piece entitled “Explaining 
what people say about sensory qualia”:
11 See (Cussins 1993) for one account of what “sufficiently unified” might amount to.
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“Independent of [the debate concerning the existence of qualia] there are things 
people usually say about their sensory experiences that relate to the notion of 
qualia.  People say that they cannot completely describe the “raw”, basic, 
ultimate aspects of their sensations (e.g. the redness of red) to others (this is 
usually termed “ineffability”).  They say that even if they cannot describe these 
aspects, they can be compared and contrasted (I shall say they have “structure”). 
And people say that there is “something it’s like” to have these raw sensory 
experiences (they have “sensory presence”).  Whether or not qualia should be 
taken to exist from a philosopher’s point of view, these three things that people 
say about their sensory experiences need to be explained.  In this chapter I show 
how… we can understand what we might mean when we say these things, 
independently of whether qualia actually exist.” (pp 31-32; emphasis added)
The inclusion of the words we have emphasized (“Whether or not qualia should be 
taken to exist from a philosopher’s point of view” and “independently of whether 
qualia actually exist”) makes O’Regan, to our lights, the same kind of agnostic 
revisionist that we are.  One difference, however, is that we suspect that our account 
will only be fully explanatory when it reaches a certain depth of detail, and that at 
that point it will likely be possible to tell whether the properties of the relevant 
virtual machine states (if any!) are sufficiently unified to count as referents of 
“qualia”.  So we are not now, nor are we likely to ever be, in a position where we can 
say “Here’s an explanation of qualia, but we don’t know if they exist”.  On the 
contrary, we have explained in outline how it is possible for them to exist, and to 
play important roles in both scientific explanations and engineering designs.
In closing, we can't resist pointing out a twist that might present itself in the case in 
which our key claim is true but our key hypothesis turns out to be false.  That is, if 
we are right that properties of virtual machine compents of the appropriate, unified 
sort are well suited to be the referent of "qualia", but we are wrong that there are 
such unified, suitable virtual machine components in humans (or other organisms), 
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we could nevertheless imagine constructing an artificial agent which acquired — 
through evolution, learning, or design — the required unified virtual machine 
components.  If, as we claim, such properties would likely lead such agents to 
develop and use the kinds of concepts we discuss above, then we might find 
ourselves in the awkward situation where humans do not, and yet robots do, have 
qualia!  If the robots were philosophically sophisticated enough, some of them might
even embrace doubly incorrect views of the situation, claiming that they lacked the 
qualia of their human forerunners because they were not biological, or because they 
could be completely understood in functionalist terms.
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